Friday, May 23, 2003
Jody Reed never walked off the field with his head bowed in shame, bearing the crushing disappointment of a Dodger crowd robbed of glory.
But Reed deserves a place right beside Mickey Owen, Ralph Branca, Terry Forster and Tom Niedenfuer in the Dodger Chamber of Horrors. The sickening cringe engendered by the memory of Forster serving up Joe Morgan's home run in 1982 or Niedenfuer tossing Jack Clark's in 1985 is every bit as applicable if you truly understand the mischief of Jody Reed. The difference with Reed is that his catastrophe came not in the hothouse mania of October but the cool epilogue of November.
Branca cost the Dodgers a pennant. Owen cost them a World Series.
Reed cost the Dodgers Pedro Martinez. No, he wasn’t traded for Martinez. He cost them Martinez, as simply and horribly as a slow roller through the legs with the title on the line.
"Get Used to Disappointment"
A 5-foot-9, 165-pound second baseman who came up with Boston in 1987, Reed was an accomplished fielder and a capable hitter, with a career batting average of .270 and three seasons of more than 40 doubles. Playing in Fenway Park boosted those mainstream stats, but even using more sophisticated metrics, Reed was better than average in his first three full seasons, with OPS+ marks of 110, 113 and 109 (100 being average), followed by a 99 in his fourth season, 1991.
The decline in Reed's offensive value sharpened in 1992, the year he turned 30. His OPS+ fell to 75. Thanks to his fielding, though, Reed remained an above-average second baseman. He was no all-around great like Roberto Alomar or Lou Whitaker, but he was what he was: in the good sense, a second baseman second class.
Meanwhile, class was completely out for the Dodgers in '92. Oh, 86 consecutive seasons without finishing in last place was easy enough, but 87 was apparently too much to ask. Having come with a game of winning the National League West in 1991, the Dodgers cratered the following season, falling to 63-99.
The Dodgers had started the campaign 9-13, three games behind San Diego, when a jury acquitted four policemen in the beating of Rodney King on April 29. Following four days of postponements, the Dodgers lost seven of nine. They rallied to 23-23 in May, then buried themselves in last place for good with a 10-game losing streak in June. They finished 35 games behind Atlanta.
Things could have been worse on the mound, which featured two stalwarts - Orel Hershiser and Ramon Martinez - along with Tom Candiotti, Kevin Gross and Bob Ojeda. Pedro Astacio came up from the minors and threw four shutouts in 11 starts, finishing with an ERA of 1.98. No Dodger starter had an ERA over 4.00. None had a winning record, either.
That was because in the process of a wardrobe change with the on-field lineup, the Dodgers were caught undressed. Mike Scioscia finished his final full season with an OPS of .548 and EQA of .230. Jose Offerman finished his first full season with an EQA of .261 and 42 errors. Classmate Dave Hansen had an OPS of .585 and an EQA of .231 as the regular third baseman. Intended saviors-in-the-outfield Eric Davis and Darryl Strawberry combined for only 119 games. First baseman Eric Karros won the Rookie of the Year award, but his 20 home runs and 30 doubles masked other deficiencies - his EQA was .271. Only 35-year-old centerfielder Brett Butler posted an EQA over .300 or an OPS over .800.
At second base, the Dodgers platooned Lenny Harris and Mike Sharperson. Harris’ EQA was .253 and his OPS+ was 79. Sharperson batted .300 with 21 doubles, representing the National League's worst team in the All-Star game. Including Eric Young and Juan Samuel, Dodger second basemen complemented Offerman’s 42 errors with 32 of their own.
As 1993 approached, the Dodgers were in such a dismal state that just about anyone could represent an improvement. General manager Fred Claire deemed Tim Wallach, 35 years old and coming off a .223, nine-homer season in 150 games in Montreal, a better option at third base than Hansen.
By that token, picking up Reed was a stroke of brilliance. Reed came to the Dodgers in an expansion-draft-day trade with the new Colorado Rockies on November 17, 1992. (The Rockies had drafted Reed from the Red Sox that same day.) Reed’s bat was a growing question mark, but when your outfit has made a slovenly 174 errors, a touch of Reed is a respectable accoutrement.
"As You Wish"
All in all, the results weren’t bad in 1993. True, the Dodgers started out 8-15 in April, and never got within five games of first place for the rest of the year, landing in fourth, 23 games behind red-hot Atlanta. However, the team showed an 18-game improvement, finishing with a .500 record of 81-81, and had the psychic thrill of eliminating the Giants from playoff contention on the final day of the season with a slam-bang 12-1 victory.
On the mound, Astacio, Candiotti and Ramon Martinez were all above average. Continuing his recovery from arm troubles, Hershiser was slightly below average but better than the year before. Strikeouts from Hershiser and Ramon were dropping, but only Gross (5.22 DERA, or defense-adjusted ERA, per Baseball Prospectus) was already real trouble.
And then, somewhat hidden in a bullpen that featured a gimpy Todd Worrell and future Dodger Stadium quizmaster Jim Gott, there was Ramon's little brother, a 164-pound 21-year-old named Pedro.
Pedro Martinez is the fair maiden of our tragedy. In his rookie season, he went 10-5 with a 2.61 ERA and 199 strikeouts in 107 innings. Because he has the same last name as one 1993 teammate and the same first name as another, it’s hard to know whether to refer to him as Pedro or Martinez. Perhaps we would do just as well to call him Buttercup, the sought-after prize of The Princess Bride.
Don’t get caught up in gender issues. It's just a device.
Of the 83 games Buttercup pitched in the minor leagues, he started 76 - including all 62 in his last three seasons. His career minor-league ERA was 3.001, including 26 starts at hitters' delight Albuquerque.
In October 1992, Dr. Frank Jobe performed the same surgery on Buttercup as he had on Orel Hershiser 2 1/2 years before. However, Buttercup's operation was on his non-throwing shoulder, and he was healthy all of '93.
For now, the Dodgers had the starting rotation covered, so there was ample time to nurture Buttercup in relief. But for a team on the rise, with Gross, Candiotti and Hershiser all over 33 years old, Buttercup's time would come.
Following the 1993 season, Claire still had greater concerns with his starting lineup. The Dodgers continued to have trouble filling the outfield spots on either side of Butler, who himself slumped to a .284 EQA. Strawberry’s Dodger career ended amid what may have been the pinnacle of his erratic behavior. He had 14 hits in his final season with the team. Davis, another seemingly lost cause, had been traded to Detroit on August 31. Cory Snyder was passable, with a .265 EQA, but declining.
Wallach (.224 EQA) was awful at third. Karros (.248 EQA) slumped at first. Offerman (.260 EQA, 30 errors) was stagnant.
And yet, a single season had made a positive difference. Rookie of the Year Mike Piazza was a monster, posting a .317 EQA. Hansen, still only 24, had a .970 OPS and .345 EQA in 105 at-bats. And three prospects were ready to try to solve the problems in the outfield: Billy Ashley, Henry Rodriguez and Raul Mondesi.
It was a confusing time to consider changes to the team. On the one hand, realignment following the 1993 season had created a third division in each league, moving first-place Atlanta and third-place Houston out of the National League West. There was only one team to beat now: the Giants.
On the other hand, that Giant team had gone 103-59 in '93.
And to give one even greater pause, a new Basic Agreement between owners and the players' union had to be negotiated in 1994. Each previous negotiation period had been plagued by a players’ strike or owners’ lockout - seven in all.
The strikes and lockouts always ended in enough time to finish the season - even in 1981, when 50 days were lost. Still, the 1993 offseason was a risky time to go for broke. With a bright, young core in an uncertain atmosphere, this was very arguably a time to be patient.
All of which made resigning Jody Reed, who had stabilized the Dodger infield in 1993 by making only five errors in 132 games, while also stemming the decline in his own offensive production by posting a .252 EQA, a very reasonable option for Claire.
There were a couple of in-house candidates to replace Reed, but with the talent of a Mondesi or Piazza. Eddie Pye had batted .329 in Albuquerque, but made 12 errors in 82 games at second base. Rafael Bournigal, a good-fielding shortstop who could have easily made the defensive switch to second, had gone 9 for 18 for the Dodgers in a short trial, but had batted only .277 in Albuquerque.
There were free agents - most notably Robby Thompson, who had a wonderful season with San Francisco, with an EQA of .305. Perhaps there was no better way to make up ground on the Giants than to grab one of their key players. However, as the best second baseman in the National League in 1993 - someone who could field competently to go with his top-notch hitting, Thompson was going to be costly.
Consider the Dodgers' seven other projected regulars besides Reed heading into 1994. Four - Piazza, Karros, Offerman and either Rodriguez or Ashley - were offensive players first. Butler was about even, his ability to catch the ball impacted by his inability to throw it. Up-and-coming Mondesi was a five-tool player, while Tim Wallach, it appeared, was quickly running down to no tools.
On this team, if any kind of a solution could be found at third base, Reed would not need to bat higher than eighth in the order.
The Dodgers made an offer to Reed. Three years, $7.8 million.
Maybe it was too much. Reed would be 34 by the end of the contract - how long would his fielding be good enough to compensate for his hitting? But with few other options available, Reed was a good choice in a rebuilding phase. The Dodgers could afford to be that generous.
The contract offer was the easy ground ball to Jody Reed. Instead of fielding it, Reed took some time to think about it.
Yeah. Reed took some time to think about it.
It couldn’t have been the money, could it? In 1993, Reed earned $2.5 million, the fifth-highest salary for a second baseman in baseball, behind Ryne Sandberg (33 years old, $5.975 million), Roberto Alomar (25, $4.933 million), Lou Whitaker (36, $3.433 million) and Craig Biggio (27, $3.05 million).
Scott Fletcher, Reed’s replacement in Boston, had an WARP (wins over replacement level) of 7.5 and earned $825,000. Mark Lemke, who had a WARP of 6.1 for Atlanta, earned $550,000. Certainly, one could argue these men were underpaid. Just as one could argue that Reed was overpaid in 1993, and about to be overpaid even more.
Instead, Reed took some time to think about it.
Months later, Ross Newhan of the Los Angeles Times tried to determine why Reed hesitated to accept the Dodger offer. Reed's answers do not reconcile easily, if at all.
On the one hand:
Reed said his summer in L.A. was "an absolute pleasure."
"I had my fun and did my job." he said. "The fans were great, the media was great.
"I felt that I not only developed a player-manager respect with Tom Lasorda, but I enjoyed being around him. I also felt the team made big improvement.
"In no way, shape or form was I thinking it wouldn’t work out for the future there."
On the other hand:
"People who put money as their top priority will say I was stupid," Reed said. "The same people will say I’m lying when I say that money isn’t my top priority.
"There were personal issues I tried to work out with the Dodgers. I had no problem with the offer if it wasn’t for those issues. I was uncomfortable with them, but I don’t want to get into what they were."
According to these comments, Reed’s delay was neither an issue of money nor an issue of happiness. As far as he was concerned, the Dodgers were offering him both. What was it, then?
Was it fear? Unnamed sources told Newhan that "Reed, as the pivot man on double plays, had some concerns for his safety on late feeds from Offerman, but how any of that played into contract talks, if it did at all, is unclear."
Or was it really the money? This is what Claire told Newhan:
"There was nothing of a personal or confidential nature involved," Claire said. "There's nothing complicated or complex about it. What we were offering and they were asking was never close.
"It's that simple. We weren't in the same ballpark."
When you come right down to it, you might find a way to explain how Owen let that game-ending strike three from High Casey go by him in Game 4 of the 1941 World Series, for a passed ball that allowed the Yankees to come back and win. Maybe it was a bad pitch – maybe a spitball. Maybe Casey was the real goat of that story, and maybe Offerman was the real goat of this one.
In the end, the ball was Owen's to block. And the contract was Reed's to sign. And neither did. Reed let it all roll right past him.
And in both cases, the Dodgers came unglued.
"The Fire Swamp"
Meet the new dilemma, same as the old dilemma. Fred Claire had solved his second base problem once, but now he had to do it again. How would he?
According to the Times, Claire checked in with Robby Thompson's agent. Whatever Thompson was demanding from the Dodgers, however, was too much. Thompson resigned with the Giants at $11.625 million for three years (an average of $3.875 million per year), plus a fourth-year option for $3.375 million.
Arguably, Claire could have shot the moon for Thompson, but budgets were different back then. Only five Dodgers - Hershiser, Strawberry, Butler, Candiotti and Wallach - earned more than $3 million per season. The highest-paid player on the Dodgers, Hershiser, earned $4,333,333.
Claire had other options. In fact, he would later choose one of them. He inked a minor-league contract with Jeff Treadway, a second baseman with Cleveland whose presence had been rendered unnecessary by the emergence of Carlos Baerga. Treadway, 30 in 1993, had an inconsistent career at the plate, but was coming off a year where he batted .303 in 97 games with an OPS+ of 102. However, he also made 10 errors, which represented a huge step backward defensively for the Dodgers.
Claire also had the option to wait.
Baseball has rarely had a shortage of owners who would pay a player more than one could fathom. Claire later told Newhan that after Thompson signed with the Giants, "Jody's agent called and said that defined the market." Scary thought.
But it would have been a fairly safe hunch to imagine that no one was going to offer Reed more in the 1993 offseason than the Dodgers did. Theirs was a remarkable offer to begin with.
And if it truly wasn't about the money, then surely, surely Reed would realize that Offermanitis, or whatever was plaguing him, was no reason to turn down the contract of his life.
Time was on Claire's side, not Reed’s. But then Claire compounded Reed's mistake.
He got on the phone again.
"I am not a great fool, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of you. But you must have known I was not a great fool, you would have counted on it, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of me!"
In the fall of 1993, Delino DeShields had all the makings of a franchise second baseman. If he wasn't the be-all and end-all, he was at least the be-all.
DeShields reached the majors at the age of 21, and in his first four seasons, from 1990-1993, his on-base percentage never dipped below .347. His worst OPS+ was 94 and he twice reached 116.
He also showed improvement in other areas. He stole 42 bases in 1990, but was successful only 65 percent of the time. By 1993, he stole 43 bases, and was safe more than eight times out of 10.
From 1991 to 1993, he reduced his errors from 27 to 18 to 11.
DeShields was no secret. In '93, he finished second in the National League All-Star balloting for second basemen behind Sandberg. DeShields was a good second baseman, apparently on the precipice of greatness at age 24. He was due for a raise from his 1993 salary of $1,537,500, but a raise that would only move him into Reed's salary neighborhood.
For Claire, there was only one issue. DeShields was not a free agent. But with Reed off contemplating the unknowable, DeShields became a temptation, one that Claire was willing to give into - with Buttercup.
Pedro Martinez, the Dodgers' brilliant young pitcher, was trade bait for Claire.
Given the uncertainty of competing in 1994, the urgency to sacrifice Buttercup to fill the second-base position seems unnecessary. But even though no one really wants to think about this now, it's not as if you could not make the case for the trade at the time. The Dodger pitching staff was by no means too good to keep Martinez, but it was still in decent shape for the time being. Meanwhile, second base was vacant.
Additionally, for all his promise, Buttercup was less proven than DeShields. And he was a pitcher - more likely to flame out. Perhaps even more likely than other pitchers.
In 1999, with the Dodgers still haunted by the decision, Newhan talked to Jobe, who operated on Buttercup, about the decision to make the pitcher available.
"I don't think I said get rid of him," Jobe said, talking about the situation for the first time. "I'd never say that, but the circumstances kind of spoke for themselves. His shoulder had come out once, and once an injury of that type occurs, you can't say it won't reoccur. He had kind of a delicate stature to start with and there were already questions about his stamina. It's a judgment call, but you had to kind of wonder, 'Golly, is this kid going to break down?' "
Amid all the uncertainty, Fred Claire could have waited to find out. He should have waited.
Instead, the announcement came on November 19, 1993. Delino DeShields was coming. Pedro Martinez was gone.
Said Claire to the Times: "I mean, we didn't stop trying to sign Jody until we made the trade, but we were never close."
He had given Reed less than a week. Not much time – but plenty for an error can come back to haunt you.
Claire went on to tell the Times: "I have a great deal of respect for Jody Reed. ... He played hard for us and he played well. As far as the negotiations, we had put forth our offer very early, before Jody really declared free agency. If he had said yes to our offer, we would not have traded for a second baseman."
A surprised Reed told the Times that he had no idea the clock was ticking.
"I mean, the only thing I don't understand about the year in L.A. was the thinking of the one guy (Claire), but he makes the calls and I'm not the first to question them. All I know is that I followed the filing rules and suddenly became a villain. What did I do?"
Playing by the rules isn't enough, though. You have to make the right plays. Reed didn’t.
"The irony is that the process left us with one of the best young second baseman in baseball, if not the best," Claire said.
Before his first Spring Training game with the Dodgers, DeShields suffered a fractured cheekbone. In April, he missed four games after a collision with Mondesi. In May, a collision with Cubs catcher Rick Wilkins left DeShields with finger injuries that put him on the disabled list for nearly a month.
He played in 89 games, batting .250 with 15 extra base hits. He walked once more than he struck out, but his OPS+ declined from 102 to 85.
Meanwhile, Buttercup became an above-average starting pitcher over the next three seasons. And then, he became perhaps the most dominating pitcher in the game. His career ERA of 2.62 through 2002 is nearly two full runs lower than the league average ERA in that time. He has averaged 10.56 strikeouts per game. In 1,892 1/3 career innings, he has allowed 1.01 baserunners (not counting hit batters) per inning.
In March 1994, Jody Reed settled for one-year, $350,000 deal with Milwaukee, plus incentives, that if he reached them all (which he didn't) would have gotten him a maximum of $1 million.
Reed had three Reed-like seasons - below average hitting with above-average fielding. He retired after spending the 1997 season as a part-timer with Detroit. Over his final three seasons, according to Baseball-Reference.com, he made a total of $2,875,000, or about what he would have made in 1994 alone had he accepted the Dodgers offer.
This tale, of course, is not about whether Jody Reed made enough money to live off of. It is simply about dreadful mistakes that cost the Dodgers.
Jody Reed booted nearly $8 million. Fred Claire booted Pedro Martinez. Both looked around and thought they had a better play to make. You can see the rationalization, so tantalizing. But what blindness. Neither saw that the correct play was right in front of them. And sometimes, all it takes to triumph is to make the simplest of plays.
Have a great Memorial Day weekend. Dodger Thoughts will return Wednesday, May 28.
Thursday, May 22, 2003
Notes on the Undercard
Lots of tidbits to report from Wednesday night's game. Let's get right to it:
1) My brother and I agree. Daryle Ward should not start in left field over Mike Kinkade, lefty-righty be damned.
2) I'm like in a Zen mode, man. Ishii is walking people, throwing 49 pitches in the first two innings, and I'm cool as a cucumber because of my newfound insight into his low Slugging Percentage Allowed. (See my May 19 entry.)
My skeptcism about whether this dreamstate can continue is justified when Ishii gives up a second-inning home run to Jose Hernandez. But it's a bases-empty shot, as is the fifth inning double Ishii allows to Chris Stynes. I'm breathing easy.
I never dreamed the wild man could be so peaceful.
3) So, when you're facing the wild man, and he's passed the 50-pitch mark with no outs in the top of the third by walking Stynes, and he then goes to 3-1 to your next batter, Ronnie Belliard, with Todd Helton on deck, what do you think? Send the runner?
Uh, not in a million years.
One busted hit-and-run later, Belliard has swung and missed, and Lo Duca has thrown out Stynes at second by a kilometer. One more pitch, and Belliard walks.
That's using your noodle.
4) Bottom of the third inning, 1-1 tie, Shawn Green on third with a triple, one out, Fred McGriff up. The Rockies play their infield in. Either they've decided that they can't score three runs in this game, or they are confident McGriff won't hit the ball hard. Neither makes sense to me.
Well, they walk McGriff, making the point moot, I guess, but still leaving me wondering. Brian Jordan comes up next and doubles, scoring a run and putting runners at second and third again, still no outs.
The infield comes in again for Ward, and he pops out to left.
5) Jordan's double nearly became his first home run since April 3, but it hits the wall. Not much later in the game, for the second night in a row, Adrian Beltre just misses hitting a home run. This team has won six games in a row and hit a total of three home runs in the process, seemingly voiding one of my major assertions of the season - that they can't win with such a low home run pace. But I'll stick to it, and still contend that this is more a case of fortunate timing.
If you'd like to keep track, the Dodgers have not homered since Saturday - 26 2/3 innings.
6) Paul Lo Duca bunts for a base hit in the bottom of the fourth inning. A cotton-candy salesman picks that moment to block my brother's view of the field. Not to worry - here comes the replay on the scoreboard. It shows Lo Duca taking some practice swings. Then he steps out of the box, maybe wiggles his neck a little. Then he steps back into the box, takes another practice swing.
That's it. Cut to Shawn Green, live, standing sedately near the batter's box.
7) It occurs to me, on the night of the national championship, that the Fox-owned Dodgers have never once promoted Fox-owned American Idol. Is this because?
--They know baseball fans don't want to see any of that American Idol stuff. They just want to see commercials on the stadium scoreboards for The Matrix Reloaded.
--They know fans have taped the show and don't want to spoil the ending for them.
--With a sale of the team on tap, Fox doesn't want people making the connection that the Dodgers and the network are connected.
--Fox isn't smart enough to realize a great cross-promotional opportunity when it sees one.
Gotta be the last one, right?
8) Another assertion of mine is violated with abandon in the top of the fifth. The Rockies walk the No. 8 hitter intentionally (Cesar Izturis) with two out in the bottom of the fifth. Again, if you can't get out one of the worst OPS men in baseball, what business do you have on the field? The move gets you out of the inning but allows the Dodgers to get Ishii's bat out of the inning.
But it pays off. The Dodgers don't score again. Rockies starter Jason Jennings allows 15 baserunners in eight innings - the Dodger team OPS for the game is .945 - but only three runners score.
9) In the top of the sixth inning, McGriff successfully digs out a throw from Izturis to retire Preston Wilson. After something of a slow start in April, the Dodger fielding has returned to its fine form of 2002 - even with McGriff anchoring the infield at first. The starting infielders have made 15 errors in 46 games.
In fact, the Dodgers have made 35 errors total - not bad. On this pace, they will finish with 123 errors on the season - although Lo Duca, who has nine already, will end up with 35 all by himself.
Of course, errors rarely tell the entire story. In the eighth inning, McGriff couldn't come up with a tough catch on a throw that might have completed a double play - critical in a one-run game. The Dodgers settled for a fielder's choice. No further harm done in the inning.
10) I'm tracking the Angel and Mariner games on the American League scoreboard in left field. Both games unfold similarly - the Angels fall far behind lowly Baltimore early, the Mariners do the same with fading Kansas City. Both teams pull within a run at the same time. And then, to my surprise, both teams lose.
The Angel starting pitching is startlingly absent - a 5.39 ERA this season from the rotation.
11) Bottom of the seventh: Posted on the big board in left is perhaps the most astonishing statistic I've ever seen there. Izturis, it says, leads the league with a .436 average (24 for 55) in at-bats after six innings.
You were expecting maybe Tony Womack?
Seconds later, Izturis singles to center.
I don't know where you find this list - but I did find on ESPN.com that in "close and late" situations (defined as results in the 7th inning or later with the batting team either ahead by one run, tied or with the potential tying run at least on deck), Izturis is 16 for 34 with an OPS of 1.015.
Do you believe in clutch hitters, or do you believe in utter randomness?
12) Eric Gagne enters in the ninth inning with a streak of eight straight strikeouts. He then gets the inning's leadoff batter, Mark Sweeney, down 0-2. The next pitch is a huge mistake - a fastball that Sweeney turns on and blasts to right field, looking like it will tie the game.
But it curves foul, and the Gagne fairy tale continues unspoiled. Sweeney strikes out, Larry Walker strikes out, Gagne survives the comebacker off of Greg Norton, the world survives a scary field-crasher, and Stynes strikes out to end the game.
Gagne has been in exactly 100 games since the start of 2002. He has saved 69 of those games, pitching 106 1/3 innings, striking out 157 batters, allowing 66 hits and walking 21.
It wasn't quite the same as Rick Monday snatching the flag from protesters, but it was startling to be sure.
In one moment, a comebacker is bouncing off the fingers of Eric Gagne's pitching hand. In the next, the Dodger trainers and coaching staff are rushing onto the field to see if Gagne is okay.
Just then, a dull roar is rising from the outfield stands. Security is running into the outfield. And Jason Romano, far from his center field position, has tasered a fan at the feet of left fielder Brian Jordan. The guy just dropped.
To witness the crime and the punishment in the same instant was very unnerving. I'm appalled and I'm relieved.
That Romano, though - he's got some range.
Wednesday, May 21, 2003
In the month of May, during which the Dodgers are 11-6, they have received this production from their 24th and 25th men on the roster:
--Larry Barnes/Jason Romano: nine games, six plate appearances, one hit
--Troy Brohawn/Steve Colyer: two games, 1 2/3 innings, 16.20 ERA
A-1 Pitching Sauce
Those are the scores of the Dodgers' past five games.
Amazingly, despite allowing only one run in each of their past five games, the past four have been come-from-behind victories. The Dodgers have been NBAing it - you can miss the first three sleepwalking quarters of the game and just tune in for the comeback. (Not that I'm advocating that.)
By the way, the San Francisco Giants, who have followed an 18-4 start by going 10-13, have allowed at least four runs in 10 of their past 11 games.
On April 12, I wrote that tallying quality starts was not a good way to measure whether the Dodger pitching staff was doing its job. True, you could use quality starts to compare the Dodger staff to other teams' pitchers. But because the Dodgers' strength is so concentrated in pitching, I argued, allowing three runs in six innings should not qualify as a quality start for the team, because it meant that for the team to win, either the bullpen would have to pitch shutout ball or that the offense would have to score five runs. In other words, something exceptional.
I think that column and subsequent ones on the same topic got more criticism than anything else I've written about this year. Regrettably, it came across that I thought the pitching was the problem with the team, not the hitting. That wasn't my point. My point was that just because the pitching was good did not mean that it should not try to be better - for the same reason that Laker fans ask Shaquille O'Neal to be better even when he averages 27 points and 14 rebounds.
Well, we can all agree now that these days, the Dodger pitching is bringing its A game.
Tonight, we'll see if it continues with Kaz "Let-'em-walk-but-don't-let-'em-sock" Ishii.
Tuesday, May 20, 2003
Here's a noteworthy addendum to Monday's discussion about Kazuhisa Ishii. It comes from a Bill James chat last week on ESPN.com:
Phil (NJ): Everyone knows that walks are bad for pitchers, and good for hitters. It's something that we hold for or against both parties, but it's only one event. To your knowledge, has anyone done a study to determine the proportional blame/credit a pitcher and batter should get for a single walk? Would that information be useful?
Bill James: (4:32 PM ET) Yes, that was studied many years ago. The batter has more to do with determining when a walk occurs than the pitcher does. This is really the central insight of the on-base percentage discussion--not that On Base Percentage is important; that's self-evident. But rather, that it is the hitter, more than the pitcher, who determines when a walk occurs.
Who's Coaching the Coaches?
Those impatient with the Dodger hitting might be interested in what happened in Chicago late Sunday.
The White Sox, 20th in the major leagues in OPS and 24th in runs scored, fired their hitting coach, Gary Ward (coincidentally, the father of Dodger reserve Daryle Ward). The Sox averaged 5.3 runs per game last year but are only tallying 4.0 per game this year.
ESPN.com's Jim Baker commented on this firing today - I hope he and ESPN don't mind that I quote him extensively:
You can probably file this move under the category of "it is better to do something than nothing even if it has no real meaning." Did Ward suddenly lose the ability to coach hitters? After all, he was the man in charge of the bats last year when the Sox were scoring the third-most runs in the league. Said Manuel to John Jackson of the Chicago Sun-Times, "This is something that I thought we needed. We tried a lot of different things to get this going. I just think this is a thing we thought would be of a big help. I thought this would jump-start us.'"
Here's an area of baseball on which there is precious little research: the impact of changing hitting coaches on team offensive performance. Probably one of the reasons nobody has bothered to do an exhaustive study on it (at least, not that I'm aware of) is that it is pretty obvious what will be discovered: there is no correlation. Former Sox player Greg Walker is the man Manuel has promoted from the minors to replace Ward. Now something interesting will happen. Paul Konerko and Joe Crede will start to play more like themselves because players of their caliber tend not to stay in the .500 to .600 OPS range for entire seasons. Walker might end up getting the credit for something that was probably going to happen eventually anyway.
By the way, I think that what Baker meant to say is that there is correlation but there is no causation.
The Dodgers, of course, look worse offensively than the White Sox. Los Angeles is 28th in OPS and 29th in runs scored. Furthermore, because of Jack Clark's motorcycle-induced injuries, there is clearly been chaos with the hitting instruction. (I wonder if coaches ever have clauses in their contracts prohibiting them from potentially dangerous activities. Perhaps Jeff Kent will become a batting instructor in the next decade and we'll find out.)
The correlation of Clark's troubles and the Dodger hitting? Some players seem to be making progress in 2003; others have fallen off a cliff. You have your Alex Coras; you have your Adrian Beltres.
No one in the Dodger organization or the media has really questioned Clark's ability to coach during his time with the Dodgers. I haven't either. Frankly, my thinking has been like Baker's - hitting coaches are only as good as the players they work with.
Obviously, no one's going to kick the man when the asphalt's already kicked him pretty good, but even before the accident, Clark has had a fairly Teflon run.
But does that really make sense?
Look at the Dodger pitching staff. The Dodgers have used 13 pitchers this season. Twelve of them have been excellent, and the 13th, Andy Ashby, may only be underperforming because there has been so little need to use him. Regardless of their pedigree, every pitcher who has been used regularly this season has done well. Check their game logs and see if you can find any of the top 12 having had more than two bad games all year.
It isn't just park effects. The Dodgers' ERA is slightly better on the road this season.
Part of that has to be knowing which pitchers to assemble on a roster. Part of that has to be pitchers knowing they have to rise to the occasion - and doing it.
Part of that has to be coaching.
And the fact that everyone from Kevin Brown to Troy Brohawn is clicking on the mound for the Dodgers does force you to wonder why the hitting is so spotty. Could it really have nothing to do with the coaching?
Previous analysis has shown that while the Dodgers figure to have a weak offense, it shouldn't be this weak. They have a similar lineup to last year's, and just by approaching - not even matching - last year's home run total, they should be able to add the half a run per game that would allow them to win regularly. Instead, they're averaging only 3.6 runs per game.
Things are going well for the Dodgers right now. They're in a soft part of their schedule. San Francisco is melting. I'm just about the last person to advocate drastic measures, and I'm one of the first to criticize the level of talent the Dodgers put in the batter's box each game. but let me pose this: As nice as it is that Cora has raised his OPS above .700, isn't it much more important that Beltre get his above .800 or .900?
As Jack Clark continues his recovery and reasserts himself in the Dodger hitting mix, the Dodgers will need to see some across-the-board improvement. Because it is possible that we have reached the point when you start to look at the Dodger hitting instruction and say, "They must be able to do better."
Monday, May 19, 2003
That Explains It
Kazuhisa Ishii's wildness gives you good reason to think that he's a pitcher more lucky than good.
Still, it turns out that there's much more going on with Ishii than his addiction to Ball 4.
Ishii has walked 30 batters in 40 innings - sufficient to drive a guy like me batty. However, Ishii has allowed only 15 runs this season, putting him in the National League top 10 with a 2.76 ERA and violating the precept that all his walks will burn him to a crisp.
Something is going very, very right for Ishii this year - and this is what it is. When opponents actually do swing their bats, Ishii is working some bigtime voodoo on them.
This season, against Ishii, opponents are:
--batting only .213 overall
--slugging only .281 overall
--batting only .140 with runners in scoring position
--slugging only .186 with runners in scoring position.
In 45 2/3 innings this season, Ishii has allowed three doubles, a triple and two home runs - an average of 1.2 extra-base hits per nine innings and less than one extra-base hit per start.
His slugging percentage allowed is the lowest in the National League. Here are the major league leaders:
2003 Slugging Percentage Allowed, Starting Pitchers
.267 Esteban Loaiza, Chicago White Sox
.277 Tim Hudson, Oakland
.279 Zach Day, Montreal
.288 Brett Myers, Philadelphia
.294 Pedro Martinez, Boston
.295 Mark Prior, Chicago
.301 Mike Mussina, New York Yankees
These stats threaten to write over our image of Ishii as someone who has no control with a new image of someone who forces hitters to beat him with his best pitch, no matter what. Ishii may be walking guys, but so far this season, they can't get around the bases.
Imagine - from now on, perhaps we will no longer cry like a baby every time we see Ishii walk a batter. (Well, maybe I'll cry just a little - after all, I am a baby.) Instead, we can just be looking for him to keep working that no-extra-base hit magic.
In fact, my view of Ishii has almost completely turned around.
Beware, though. It could turn right back.
In 2002, Ishii allowed only two home runs before May 31 - same as in 2003. After May 31, however, Ishii allowed 18 home runs. The walks remained relatively constant, so it wasn't as if the homers were a substitute for the walks. Ishii's strikeouts remained strong throughout 2002 as well - in the neighborhood of eight per nine innings. For whatever reason, though, hitters started muscling up on Ishii around summertime.
Ishii is back at 7.9 strikeouts per nine innings this year, but you have to remain skeptical that Ishii can keep the batting averages and slugging percentages of his opponents at this 2003 microscopic level. It's hard to believe that at some point, those walks won't burn him yet.
But this analysis has given me something new to look at. For a while, at least, it may be more interesting to see what happens when opponents swing the bat against Ishii than what happens when they don't.